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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff-Respondent, :
v.

:

DARREN NEIL GRUEBER

:

Case No. 890344

Category No. 13

Defendant-Appellant. :

BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO PETITION
FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
QUESTION PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
Whether the Court of Appeals correctly determined that
defendant lacked standing to challenge the seizure of the
shotgun.
OPINION BELOW
State v, Grueber, 776 P.2d 70 (Utah App. 1989) (See
Addendum A for text of the decision).
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is a petition for writ of certiorari from the Utah
Court of Appeals which affirmed defendant's conviction for
aggravated assault, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah
Code Ann. S 76-5-103 (1978) (amended 1989), entered June 2, 1989.
Defendant's petition for rehearing was denied July 7, 1989.
Court has jurisdiction to hear this petition pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. SS 78-2-2(3)(a) (Supp. 1989) and 78-2a-4 (1987).

This

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
For purposes of this brief, the State relies on the
following provision;
1.

Rule 43, Rules of the Utah Supreme Court (a copy of

which is attached as Addendum B).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant, Darren Neil Grueber, was charged with
aggravated assault, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah
Code Ann. S 76-5-103 (1978) (amended 1989).

Defendant was

convicted of the charge on August 12, 1987, following a jury
trial, in the Third Judicial District Court, in and for Salt Lake
County, State of Utah, the Honorable Michael R. Murphy, Judge,
presiding.

Defendant was sentenced to a term of zero to five

years at the Utah State Prison.
On appeal, the Utah Court of Appeals affirmed the
conviction.

State v. Grueber, 776 P.2d 70 (Utah App. 1989).
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS

The State relies on the statement of facts given by the
Court of Appeals in its decision.

The State does not concur in

the statement of facts given by defendant in his petition for
writ of certiorari, finding that defendant is misleading in his
use of the facts and totally ignores pertinent facts found by the
trial court and relied on by the Court of Appeals.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Defendant has not cited "special and important reasons"
in this case for this Court to grant certiorari.

His complaint

that the Court of Appeals decided his case wrongly is not of the

character of the reasons cited by this Court in Rule 43 of the
Rules of the Utah Supreme Court for granting certiorari.
The decision of the trial court and the Court of
Appeals that defendant lacked standing to challenge the seizure
of a shotgun belonging to another was correct.

As the Court of

Appeals ruled, evidence that defendant may have had a
relationship with the owner of the shotgun, without more, is
insufficient to establish that defendant had standing to
challenge its seizure.

There was no evidence that defendant had

either a proprietary interest in the gun or permission to use it
at will or on any other basis. The evidence demonstrated that
defendant did not even know that the gun was in the van which
defendant was driving and which belonged to another.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
DEFENDANT'S ARGUMENT IN HIS PETITION FOR WRIT
OF CERTIORARI IS NOT OF THE CHARACTER OF
REASONS FOR WHICH THIS COURT GRANTS
CERTIORARI.
Defendant argues in his petition for writ of certiorari
that the decision of the Court of Appeals in this case is
contrary to the facts and the law.

His argument basically

disputes the factual findings of the trial court in the hearing
on the motion to suppress filed by defendant, and attempts to
substitute his own version of the facts for that found by the
trial court and accepted by the Court of Appeals.

He also

disputes the finding of the Court of Appeals that the cases
relied on by the State more closely fit the current case than
those cases cited by defendant.

He asks this Court to grant

certiorari and determine that the cases he cited below are closer
to the present case.

At bottom, defendant disagrees with the

factual and legal findings of the lower courts and wants this
Court to tell them that his version is correct.
Rule 43 of the Rules of the Utah Supreme Court dictates
that review by writ of certiorari is discretionary and will only
be allowed for "special and important reasons".

This Court has

given a non-exhaustive list of reasons which shows the "character
of reasons that will be considered".

This list includes cases in

which there is a conflict between panels of the Court of Appeals
or between the Court of Appeals and decisions of this Court.
Also cognizable are cases in which the decision of the Court of
Appeals so far departs from accepted case law that this Court
must exercise its supervisory powers, or cases in which an
important question of law was decided by the Court of Appeals
which should be settled by this Court.

Defendant's argument does

not rise to the level of seriousness which is demonstrated by the
list contained in Rule 43.
Defendant does baldly state that the decision in this
case would broaden police power to search vehicles "with
impunity" (Brief of Appellant on petition at 16). This reading
of the decision of the Court of Appeals is totally erroneous as
will be addressed in Point II. The decision stands for the timehonored proposition that a person must establish a proprietary or
possessory interest in the item seized before he or she can
challenge the seizure of the item.

The Court of Appeals

correctly found that defendant had not demonstrated, as a

nonowner, any legitimate expectation of privacy in the gun;
indeed, it found that defendant had testified that he did not
even know the gun was in the van when the gun was seized,
Grueber, 776 P.2d at 75. As the court said:
There is no evidence in the record
establishing Grueber had Ms. Ray's permission
to use either the van or the gun at will, had
a key to the van, or even how often he had
used either the van or the gun in the past.
Grueber cites no facts which other courts
have found relevant to demonstrate a nonowner
had possessory or proprietary interest in an
automobile. Grueber merely relies on his
alleged live-in relationship with Ms. Ray to
claim a privacy interest in the van and gun.
Even assuming the existence of such a
relationship, under the facts in the record,
we find Grueber did not have a legitimate
expectation of privacy in the van or the
seized shotgun.
Grueber, 776 P.2d at 75 (emphasis added).
Defendant's argument is only that the trial court and
the Court of Appeals did not accept his argument that a live-in,
quasi-marital relationship between defendant and the owner of the
gun gave defendant standing to challenge the seizure of the gun.
Mere rejection of a defendant's theory of a case is not a reason
for granting a writ of certiorari which rises to the level of the
reasons which this Court has given as examples for granting the
writ.
POINT II
THE COURT OF APPEALS CORRECTLY FOUND THAT
DEFENDANT DID NOT DEMONSTRATE STANDING TO
CHALLENGE THE SEIZURE OF THE GUN.
Defendant claims that the Court of Appeals was
incorrect in determining that his relationship with Carolyn Ray,
the owner of the gun, did not confer on him standing to challenge

the seizure of the gun.

In the alternative, he claims that he

was prejudiced because the trial court did not allow him to
present more evidence that defendant and Ms. Ray had a quasimarital relationship.

These claims miss the point of the

decision of the Court of Appeals.
Defendant never challenged the search of the van in
which the gun was found.

Specifically, at the suppression

hearing, he conceded that the search of the van was lawful
(Transcript of suppression hearing at 27). Again, in his brief
on appeal, he stated that trial counsel had conceded that the
search of the van was lawful, but argued that the seizure of the
gun from the van was unlawful (Brief of Appellant on appeal at
14).

The State argued that defendant did not have standing to

challenge the seizure.

The State cited this Court's decision in

State v. Valdez, 689 P.2d 1334 (Utah 1984), for the proposition
that mere possession of property or presence therein or thereon,
without some showing of a legitimate expectation of privacy in
the item seized, is not enough to gain standing to oppose the
seizure.

See also Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978); State

v. Purcell, 586 P.2d 441 (Utah 1978); State v. Constantino, 732
P.2d 125 (Utah 1987).

The Court of Appeals correctly applied

this case law when it determined that defendant had not
established a privacy interest in the shotgun seized from the
van.

All of defendant's presented or proffered evidence that he

The State also argued below that the search of the van was
lawful. However, in light of defendant's concession that that
search was lawful, the State, in hindsight, recognizes that an
analysis of the legality of the search of the van was not
necessary to determining the legality of the gun's seizure.

and Ms. Ray (who had purchased the gun) had lived together and
had children together did not automatically confer standing on
defendant in property in which he had no ownership interest.
Defendant did not present any evidence below of permission to use
the gun and even conceded that he did not even know the gun was
in the van (Record 130 at 134). A live-in, quasi-marital
relationship is not enough, without more, to give defendant
standing.

That is the holding of the Court of Appeals, and

defendant's argument that more evidence of the character of the
relationship between defendant and Ms. Ray would have
demonstrated standing, without indicating how the evidence
related specifically to ownership or permissive use of the gun,
is not persuasive.

Such an argument clearly does not provide a

basis for the granting of certiorari.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the State respectfully requests
that this Court deny the petition for writ of certiorari filed in
this case.
RESPECTFULLY submitted this J^^day

of September,

1989.
R. PAUL VAN DAM
Attorney General
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Assistant Attorney General
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competent evidence demonstrating that Mr.
Goodale tested positive for marijuana while
on duty, and in light of Mr. Goodale's
sworn testimony to the contrary, the
Board's conclusion that Mr. Goodale was
not terminated for disqualifying conduct
under the Employment Security Act is supported by substantial evidence in the
record.
COMMISSION'S REFUSAL TO
CONSIDER PROFFERED
TEST RESULTS
[5] We next address Grace Drilling's
claim the Board abused its discretion9 in
refusing to reopen the record to consider
the proffered test results which allegedly
demonstrated that Mr. Goodale had tested
positive for marijuana. Grace Drilling concedes it refused to submit the test results
at the administrative hearing but claims it
was trying to avoid confidentiality problems and protect Mr. Goodale's privacy interests. We are not persuaded by Grace
Drilling's argument
First, it is undisputed that Mr. Goodale
was discharged solely because he tested
positive for illegal drugs while on duty. It
reasonably follows that the test results
were crucial to Grace Drilling's burden of
establishing that Mr. Goodale was discharged for "just cause." Grace Drilling
was given two opportunities to present the
results and lay the appropriate foundation
for receiving them into evidence. Grace
Drilling declined on both occasions, and its
post-hearing confidentiality justification
simply is not persuasive as the appeal referee could have taken the appropriate precautions to protect the confidentiality of
the report
In short, the test results were clearly
available at the time of the hearing and the
Board so noted. The Board declined to
consider the test results stating to do so
would have deprived Mr. Goodale of the
opportunity to rebut or cross-examine. We
agree. Elementary fairness in unemployment compensation adjudications includes a
t . Compart Utah Code Ann. f 63-46b-16(4)(hXi)
(19SS) with Uuh Admin R. 475-!0d-3(2) (19S7-

party's right to see adverse evidence and
be afforded an opportunity to rebut such
evidence. See, e.g., Lanier-Brugh, inc. v.
Industrial Comm\ 761 P.2d 572, 575-76
(Utah CtApp.1988). Grace Drilling argues
that Mr. Goodale could be given an opportunity to challenge the results if the matter
were merely remanded to the appeal referee to take additional evidence. However,
we do not believe granting parties "three
bites at the apple" is consonant with efficient administrative procedure. Grace
Drilling had ample opportunity to present
its case and failed to meet its burden. We
hold the Board did not abuse its discretion
in refusing to consider the test results.
Based on the foregoing, the Board's order granting Mr. Goodale unemployment
compensation benefits is affirmed.
GARFF and JACKSON, JJ., concur.
(O {tn«UNKISttTlM>

STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and
Respondent
v.
Darren Neil GRUEBER, Defendant
and Appellant
No. 870532-CA.
Court of Appeals of Utah.
June 2, 1989.
Rehearing Denied July 7, 1989.
Defendant was convicted of aggravated assault in the Third District Court Salt
Lake County, Michael R. Murphy, J., and
defendant appealed. The Court of Appeals, Billings, J., held that (1) defendant
did not have legitimate expectation of privacy in van searched or gun seized, and
W).

STATE v. GRUEBER
thus did not have standing to object to
search or seizure; (2) defendant was not
prejudiced by police officer's reliance on
reports and notes during direct examination which had been requested by, but Dot
furnished to, defense counsel during discovery; (S) defendant did not receive ineffective assistance of counsel due to defense
counsel's introduction of prior convictions;
and (4) evidence was sufficient to support
conviction for aggravated aaaault
Affirmed.

1. Searches and Seizures *»162
Legitimate expectation of privacy test
for standing to object to search is not
"bright line" test, but is fact sensitive.
U.S.C.A. ConsLAmend. 4.
1 Searches and Seizures *»145
Defendant did not have legitimate expectation of privacy fa van searched and
shotgun seized during search, and thus did
not have standing to object to search and
seizure, even though defendant had alleged
live-in relationship with owner of van and
gun; defendant was not fa van when it was
searched and gun seized, and there was no
evidence fa record establishing that defendant had owner's permission to use either
van or gun at will, had key to van, or even
how often he had used either van or gun fa
put U&CJL ConstAmend. 4.
1 Criminal Law *»1155
Trial court's ruling on motion for mistrisl should not be upset unless it clearly
ippears trial court abused its discretion.

Utah 71

done had he seen complete reports, did not
affect "substantial rights" of defendant
U.C.A.1953, 77--S&-S0(a).
See publication Words and Phrases
for other judicial constructions and
definitions.
S. Criminal Law *-641.13(l)
Mere fact that defendant received unfavorable result does not give to rise to
conclusion that defendant received ineffective assistance of counsel. U.S.C.A. Const
Amend. 6.
i Criminal Law «-*41.13<6)
Defendant did not meet his burden of
showing that introduction of his prior convictions into evidence through direct examination by defense counsel was prejudicial,
and thus defendant could not prevail on
ineffective assistance of counsel claim; evidence received during trial against defendant was convincing independent of admission of prior convictions that had attenuated relevance to crime charged. UJ5.C.A.
ConsLAmend. 6.
7. Assault and Battery e»tt(4)
Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of aggravated assault; victim observed shotgun sticking out of driver's window of van, observed large tattoo on driver's upper arm, heard shotgun blast, and
positively identified defendant as person
who fired shotgun at him. U.C.A.1953,
76-4-103.
S. Criminal Law #»USM<t)
When determining whether there was
sufficient evidence to convict defendant of
aggravated assault, Court of Appeals
would not second guess determination of
trial court as to credibility of complainant

1 Criminal Law *»M?
Police officer's reliance on reports and
Richard G. Uday, Salt Lake City, for
*>tes during his direct examination which
defendant
and appellant
hid been requested by, but not furnished
to, defense counsel during discovery, did
R. Paul Van Dam and Chariene Barlow,
*ot require a mistrial, where impeachment Salt Lake City, for plaintiff and responof complainant on minor identification dent
questions due to lack of identification fafor***** fa police officer's partial report,
Before DAVIDSON, BENCH and
*Uch defendant allegedly would not have BILLINGS, U.
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OPINION

BILLINGS, Judge:
Defendant Darren Neil Grueber ("Grueber") was convicted of aggravated assault,
a third degree felony, in violation of Utah
Code Ann. ( 76-6-103 (1978). Grueber appeals from his conviction claiming: (1) a
shotgun seized during a warrantless search
should have been suppressed; (2) he was
prejudiced by the State's failure to produce
requested information during discovery;
(3) he was denied effective assistance of
counsel; and (4) there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction. We affirm.
FACTS
On August 13, 1986, Michael Wade was
driving his automobile southbound onto the
1-15 on-ramp near 13th South in Salt Lake
City, Utah. A green and white Ford van
pulled up beside Mr. Wade in the righthand lane of the on-ramp. The driver of
the van yelled at Mr. Wade for not driving
fast enough and attempted to force Mr.
Wade's automobile off the road. The two
vehicles proceeded side by side up the ramp
for a sufficient length of time for Mr.
Wade to view the driver of the van.
After merging onto the interstate, Mr.
Wade was still traveling next to the green
and white van. At this time, he observed a
woman passenger in the van pointing a
shotgun at him. Mr. Wade quickly applied
his brakes and positioned his automobile
directly behind the green and white van.
From this vantage point, Mr. Wade observed the van's license plate number (674
ALH) and other identifiable features. As
the vehicles approached the 1-80 interchange, Mr. Wade veered to the far left
lane and fled toward the 1-80 entrance. At
this time, Mr. Wade observed a shotgun
sticking out of the driver's window of the
green and white van, observed a large tattoo on the driver's upper arm and heard
shotgun blasts. From these events, Mr.
Wade concluded the driver of the van had
fired two shots at his automobile. The
shotgun blasts neither damaged his automobile nor injured the occupants.

The green and white van did not follow
Mr. Wade as he entered the 1-80 interchange. Mr. Wade exited 1-80 and went
directly to the South Salt Lake Police Department He reported the incident and his
observations to the police, including the
van's license plate number. A registration
check disclosed Carolyn Ray as the owner
of the van.
On October 14, 1986, Mr. Wade viewed a
number of photos from which he positively
identified Grueber as the person who fired
the shotgun at him.
In a separate incident, on November 7,
1986, Officer Scott Robinson of the Murray
City Police Department was informed the
occupants of a green and white van, license
plate number 674 ALH, had attempted to
sell a welder which the police had reason to
believe had been stolen during a recent
burglary at the Murray City Golf Course.
Officer Robinson requested a registration
check which again revealed Carolyn Ray as
the owner of the van. Officer Robinson
then proceeded to the address listed on the
registration, and waited for the van's arrival. When the van entered the driveway,
Officer Robinson exited his car and identified himself as a police officer. As he
approached the van, Officer Robinson observed the driver get out of the van and
run to the back of the house. Officer
Robinson followed the driver, but his pursuit was impeded by a dog tied to the side
of the house. The driver was later apprehended by Officer Robinson and identified as the defendant, Grueber.
Officer Robinson returned to the van after encountering the dog and observed Carolyn Ray, several children, and an adult
male exiting the van. Through the windows of the van, Officer Robinson observed
a welder matching the description of the
stolen welder. Soon thereafter, a representative of the golf course arrived and
positively identified the welder in the van
as the welder stolen from the Murray City
Golf Course. Officer Robinson then entered the van and attempted to locate the
aerial number on the welder. Once inside,
Officer Robinson saw a shotgun with a

STATE v. GRUEBER
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pistol grip situated Dear the driver'i seat,
partially covered but in plain view.
Officer Robinson ran a eheck for warrants on Grueber. The eheck showed a
warrant for aggravated assault from
Sandy City and another warrant from Salt
Lake City. Officer Robinson seised the
welder, the shotgun, and some Halloween
masks from the van and arrested Grueber.
A bearing was held prior to trial on
Grueber's motion to suppress the shotgun
from evidence and Grueber renewed his
objection at trial. Officer Robinson articulated three reasons for seizing the shotgun:
(1) the gun was present with other stolen
property; (2) the driver, with an outstanding warrant for aggravated assault, had
fled the scene and thus the officer believed
the gun could have been used in the prior
crime; (8) the Halloween masks were
present with the weapon, indicating a criminal purpose for the presence of the gun.
Tbe trial court denied Grueber's motion,
finding Grueber did not have standing to
object to tbe seizure of the gun and that
the seizure was proper.

ability was probably, on the whole, beneficial to Grueber, and (S) any possible prejudice would be prevented or mitigated by
giving defense counsel adequate time to
prepare for and incorporate into their trial
strategy any new information.
Subsequently, Grueber was convicted of
aggravated assault under Utah Code Ann.
f 76-5-103UXb) (1978).
SUPPRESSION OF THE SHOTGUN

Grueber argues the shotgun seized from
the green and white van should not have
been allowed into evidence. Although
Grueber concedes the shotgun was in plain
view when seized, he claims the shotgun
was not clearly incriminating and the officer did not have probable cause to believe it
was connected to any criminal activity.
The State argues Grueber had no expectation of privacy in the van or the gun, and
thus he does not have standing to object to
the seizure of tbe gun. The State further
argues that even if Grueber could object to
tbe seizure, the police officer had probable
cause to seize the gun since it was clearly
At trial, Officer Richard Mattingly, a wit- incriminating. We do not reach the issue
ness for the State, utilized notes during his of whether the gun found in plain view
direct examination which had not been pro- during an otherwise proper search was
vided to the prosecution, and consequently, properly seized as clearly incriminating
had not been furnished to defense counsel, since we agree that Grueber did not have
though the notes were covered by a de- an expectation of privacy in the van or the
fense discovery request Defendant filed a gun, and thus cannot complain of the aeifeotion for a mistrial claiming he was preju- sure.
diced by tbe late disclosure of these police
Hie concept of standing is not 'theoreports and notes. The trial court allowed
retically
separate" under the fourth amenddefense counsel additional time to examine
ment
Rakas
v. Illinois, 439 VS. 128,189,
tbe notes and prepare for his cross-exami»9
S.Ct
421,
428, 58 LEd.2d 887 (1978).
•ation of Officer Mattingly. As a result,
The
proper
test,
which implicitly incorpotbe trial was recessed for 24 hours. The
rates
the
concept
of standing, is whether
•sort also required the State to recall any
the
person
who
claims
the protection of the
prior witnesses, including Mr. Wade, if defourth
amendment
"has
a legitimate expecfense counsel wished to re-examine the wittation
of
privacy
in
the
invaded
place." Id
in light of the newly discovered
st
148,
99
S.Ct
at
480.
See
also
State v.
However, the court denied GrueConstantino,
782
P.2d
125,
126-27
(Utah
W i motion for a mistrial finding: (1) the
1987);
State
v.
Larocco,
742
P.2d
89,
91
fcoovery violation was discovered prior to
(Utah CtApp.1987).
fe conclusion of the State's case-in-chief
The United States Supreme Court has
•ad therefore, any prejudice was cured; (2)
&* information in the notes was inculpato- repeatedly recognized that an expectation
ry • nature and since neither party ob- of privacy in an automobile is different
1 the notes prior to trial, their unavail- from an expectation of privacy in one's
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residence. "We have on numerous occasions pointed out that cars are not to be
treated identically with houses or [sjpartments for [fjourth [ajmendment purposes."
Rakas, 439 U.S. at 148, 99 S.Ct at 433
(citing United States v. Chadwick, 433
U.S. 1, 12, 97 S.Ct 2476, 2484, 63 L.Ed.2d
538 (1977); United States v. MartinezFuerte, 428 U.S. 643, 661, 96 S.Ct 3074,
3084, 49 LEd.2d 1116 (1976); Cardwell v.
Lewis, 417 U.S. 683, 590, 94 S.Ct 2464,
2469, 41 LEd.2d 325 (1974)).

ing marijuana. A police investigation revealed the car that defendant was driving
was registered to another person. Defendant did not claim he had driven the car
with the permission of the owner or that he
had borrowed the car under circumstances
that would imply permissive use. 7.32 P.2d
at 127. The court held that "[a]bsent
claimed right to possession, [defendant]
could not assert any expectation of privacy
in the items seized ard had no standing to
object to the search." Id.

(1] The legitimate expectation of privacy test is not a "bright line" test but is fact
sensitive. Therefore, in order to determine
whether Grueber had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the van or the gun, we
compare the facts before us with the facts
in other similar cases.

In State v. Valdez, defendant was arrested for producing a driver's license with a
false name following a stop by police officers who noticed that defendant's car had
no front license plate. Defendant told police officers that he did not own the car.
The officers searched the car without obtaining a warrant and discovered an attache case in the trunk which was closed
but contained a check that partially protruded from the case. The officers opened
the case and discovered certain items of
false identification. Because defendant
conceded that he did not own the car or
attache case containing the evidence complained of, the Utah Supreme Court held
that he did not have any legitimate expectation of privacy in the effects searched. 689
P.2d at 1835. Accord State v. Purcell, 586
P.2d at 443.

[2] The State relies on, among others,
the following cases to assert Grueber had
no reasonable expectation of privacy in the
green and white van at the time the shotgun was seized from it Rakas; Constantino; State v. Valdez, 689 P.2d 1334 (Utah
1984); State v. Purcell, 686 P.2d 441 (Utah
1978).'
In Rakas, police stopped a van they suspected to be the get-away car in a recent
robbery. The defendants were passengers
in the car which the owner was driving.
The police searched the car and found a
box of rifle shells in the glove compartment
and a sawed-off rifle under the front passenger seat Defendants were arrested.
The Court held the defendants, as occupants of the van, had neither a proprietary
nor a possessory interest in the automobile,
nor an interest in the property seized. 439
VS. at 148, 99 S.Ct at 438. Although the
defendants were in the car with the permission of the owner, the Court found they did
not have a legitimate expectation of privacy in the particular areas of the automobile
which the police searched. Id.
The Utah Supreme Court has adopted
the Rakas analysis in at least three of its
decisions. In State v. Constantino, defendant was convicted of possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute
after an inventory search of the car he was
driving disclosed two plastic bags contain-

Grueber argues the following cases support his claim that he did have a reasonable
expectation of privacy in the van: United
States v. Jejfert, 342 U.S. 48, 72 S.Ct 93,
96 LEd. 59 (1951); State v. Larocco, 742
P.2d 89 (Utah CtApp.1987); In re J.R.M.,
487 S.W.2d 502 (Mo.1972) (en banc).
In United States v. Jeffers, the Supreme
Court held the defendant had a reasonable
expectation of privacy in his aunt's hotel
room where the defendant had been given
a key to the hotel room, had the occupant's
permission to use the room at will, and
often entered the room for various pur
poses. 342 VS. at 50-62, 72 S.Ct at 94-96.
In State v. Larocco, this court held the
defendant had standing to challenge the
legality of the search of a van which the
police subsequently determined was stolen.
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At the time of the search, the van was
registered in the defendant's name, was
parked in front of his home, and had been
used exclusively by the defendant as the
asserted owner and by no one else for an
extended period of time. 742 P.2d at 92.
Grueber also relies on In re J.R.M.,
wherein the Missouri Supreme Court held
that a juvenile had standing to challenge
the warrantless search of an automobile
even though he was not the record owner
of the van, and was not on the premises at
the time of the search. The evidence
showed the juvenile had his own key to the
car, had the right to use the car at any
time, regularly drove the car to school,
used the car as much as he would have if
the title had been in his name, was included
as an insured driver under the automobile
insurance policy on the car, and lived with
his parents where the car was kept 487
S.W.2d at 609.
We believe the facts presented in this
esse are closer to the cases cited by the
State where courts have found a nonowner
ksd no reasonable expectation of privacy in
an automobile. In the instant case, the
seized shotgun was owned by and registered to defendant's girlfriend, Carolyn
Ray. Similarly, Ms. Ray was the registered owner of the green and white van.
Although the van was parked in front of
Ms. Ray's home at the time of the search
sad defendant claimed he Bved with Ms.
Ray, defendant was not in the van when it
vis searched and the gun seised. At the
time the gun was seised, Grueber stated he
Ad not even know the gun was in the van.

a legitimate expectation of privacy in the
van or the seized shotgun.
DISCOVERY VIOLATION
Grueber next argues the trial court erred
in denying his motion for a mistrial after
Officer Mattingly relied on reports and
notes during his direct examination which
had been requested by, but not furnished
to, defense counsel during discovery'. Specifically, Grueber claims he was prejudiced
because had he known the contents of the
additional reports he would not have impeached Mr. Wade on cross-examination as
to certain facts testified to but not appearing in any police report These facts included that the shotgun used in the alleged
assault did not have a stock but had a
strap, and that there was a "Harley-Davidson" sticker on the back of the van driven
by Grueber.
[8] A trial court's ruling on a motion
for mistrial should not be upset unless it
clearly appears the trial court abused its
discretion. See State v. Speer, 750 P.2d
186, 190 (Utah 1988); State v. Peterson,
660 PAi 1887, 1390 (Utah 1977); State v.
Hodge*, 80 Utah 2d 867, 517 P.2d 1822,
1824 (1974). See also State v. Thompson,
751 P.2d 805, 818 (Utah CtApp.1988).

(4) Utah Code Ann. f 77-85-80(s)
(1982) provides 'Ta)ny error, defect, irregularity or variance which does not affect the
substantial rights of a party shall be disregarded." In State v. Knight, 784 P.2d
918 (Utah 1987), the Utah Supreme Court
stated,
[w]e have ruled in several cases that the
There is no evidence in the record estabRule 80 phrase "affect the substantial
Ithing Grueber had Ms. Ray's permission
rights of a party" means that an error
to use either the van or the gun at will, had
4
warrants reversal "only if a review of
key to the van, or even bow often he had
the record persuades the court that with**d either the van or the gun in the past
out the error there was 'a reasonable
Grueber cites no facts which other courts
likelihood qf a more favorable result
•*ve found relevant to demonstrate a DOfor the defendant9"
^ w r had a possessory or proprietary
Merest in an automobile. Grueber merely Id. at 919 (quoting State v. Fontana, 680
*fcs on his alleged live-in relationship P.2d 1042, 1048 (Utah 1984) (emphasis in
*fch lb. Ray to claim a privacy interest in original)). The Knight court provided fur** v*n and gun. Even assuming the exist- ther guidance by defining what is meant by
^ * of such a relationship, under the facts a "reasonable likelihood." "For an error to
• *< record, we find Grueber did not have require reversal, the likelihood of a differ-
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ent outcome must be sufficiently high to
undermine confidence in the verdict" 784
P.2d at 920.
We are not convinced the impeachment
of Mr. Wade on minor questions concerning
the identification of the gun and van because such information was not contained
in Officer Mattingly's partial report affected the "substantia] rights" of the defendant We conclude there is not a reasonable likelihood the trial outcome would
have been more favorable to Grueber if
Grueber had received the materials used by
Officer Mattingly, prior to trial, and had
therefore, conducted his cross-examination
of Mr. Wade in a different manner. Cf.
State v. Schreuder, 712 P.2d 264, 276
(Utah 1985); State v. Carter, 707 P.2d 656,
661-62 (Utah 1985).
INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE
OF COUNSEL
During direct examination, Grueber was
asked by his attorney if he had been convkted of a felony. Grueber responded that
he had been convicted of distribution of
marijuana in 1980. Upon further questioning, Grueber also admitted that in 1978, at
the age of 17, he had been convicted of
joy-riding, a misdemeanor. Grueber claims
these convictions were properly excludable
under Utah R.Evid. 609 and thus his counsel's performance was constitutionally defective.
In order to establish ineffective assistance of counsel, Grueber must meet the
elements of a two-prong test
First, the defendant must show that
counsel's performance was deficient
This requires showing that counsel made
errors so serious that counsel was not
functioning as the "counsel" guaranteed
the defendant by the [sjixth [amendment Second, the defendant must show
that the deficient performance prejudiced
the defense. This requires showing that
counsel's errors were so serious as to
deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a
trial whose result is reliable.
1. Counsel did make a successful motion in limine to exclude testimony as to an alleged assault with a machete committed by defendant*

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,
687, 104 S.Ct 2052, 2064, 80 LEd.2d 674
(1984). The Utah Supreme Court adopted
the two-prong Strickland standard in
State v. Frame, 728 P.2d 401, 405 (Utah
1986).
15] The mere fact that defendant received an unfavorable result does not give
rise to the conclusion that defendant received ineffective assistance of counsel.
See, e.g., State v. Buel, 700 P.2d 701, 703
(Utah 1985). If the defendant fails to
make the required showing of either deficient performance on counsel's part or of
sufficient prejudice as a result of counsel's
error, then defendant's ineffectiveness
claim is defeated. See, e.g., State v.
Geary, 707 P.2d 645, 646 (Utah 1985).
To establish prejudice,
[i]t is not enough to claim that the alleged errors had some conceivable effect
on the outcome or could have had a prejudicial effect on the fact finders. To be
found sufficiently prejudicial, defendant
must affirmatively show that a "reasonable probability" exists that but for
counsel's error, the result would have
been different We have defined ''reasonable probability" as that sufficient to
undermine confidence in the reliability of
the verdict
Frame, 728 P.2d at 405. Accord State v.
Archuleta, 747 P.2d 1019, 1023 (Utah
1987).
[6] In the instant case, we need not
address whether counsel's questioning of
Grueber about his prior convictions was
deficient performance,1 as we find Grueber
has not met his burden of showing that the
introduction of his prior convictions into
evidence was prejudicial. In effect Grueber has failed to show that but for his
counsel's alleged deficiencies, there exists
•ny "reasonable probability" that the
jury's verdict would have been different
Moreover, this case is distinguishable
from State v. Gentry, 747 R2d 1032 (Utah
1987), where the court found that counsel's
ThU U tome evidence that counsel's choice **
to dispute the admissibility of the less j * ^
didal convictions was merely trial strategy
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failure to exclude prior convictions was reversible error. In Gentry, the defendant
did not take the stand because of the admission of his prior convictions. The Gentry court was persuaded there was a reasonable likelihood that the result would
have been different because the count could
only speculate as to what defendant's testimony might have been and its effect upon
the outcome of the trial. Id at 1038. In
the instant case, Grueber took the stand
and the evidence received during trial
against him was convincing independent of
the admission of prior convictions that had
attenuated relevance to the crime charged.
Rather, this case is comparable to Hoeck
v. Municipality of Anchorage, 698 P.2d
666 (Alaska Ct.App.1985), where defendant's trial counsel conceded that defendant had five prior "driving while intoxicated" convictions and four prior "driving
with license revoked" convictions. The
court held that such a concession did not
amount to ineffective assistance of counsel.
Id at 668. Accord Stevens v. State, 540
¥2d 1199 (Okla.Crim.App.1975).
Because Grueber failed to show the introduction into evidence of his prior convictions was prejudicial to the outcome of the
trial, Grueber's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel must fail.
SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE
[7,8] Grueber's final claim is that insufficient evidence existed to support his
aggravated assault conviction. We disagree.

»
Grueber does not claim there was insufficient evidence to support the elements of
aggravated assault but simply claims the
assault victim, Mr. Wade, was not credible.
This court will not second guess the determinations of the fact finder as to witness
credibility, and based on the record before
us the evidence is not " 'sufficiently inconclusive or inherently improbable that reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the crime of which he [or she] was
convicted/ " State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116,
124 (Utah 1989) (quoting State v. Petree,
659 ?2A at 444). Thus, we find that there
was sufficient evidence upon which to base
Grueber's aggravated assault conviction.
CONCLUSION
In summary, we find the trial court properly denied Grueber's motion to suppress
the shotgun from evidence because Grueber did not have a legitimate expectation of
privacy in the van searched or the gun
seized. We further find Grueber was not
prejudiced by the State's discovery violation since there is not a reasonable likelihood that the trial outcome would have
been different in the absence of the violation. Additionally, Grueber did not receive
ineffective assistance of counsel due to
counsel's introduction of prior convictions
because Grueber failed to show this prejudiced the outcome of his trial. Finally, we
find there was sufficient evidence to support Grueber's assault conviction.
Based upon the foregoing, we affirm.

In considering a sufficiency of the evidence question, we will review the evidence
DAVIDSON and BENCH, JJ.,
and all inferences reasonably drawn from it concur.
in the light moat favorable to the jury
verdict State v. Petrte, 669 PJ2d 443, 444
(Utah 1983). We will reverse a jury conviction for insufficient evidence only when
HT auNif i snn«
that evidence "is sufficiently inconclusive
or inherently improbable that reasonable
minds must have entertained a reasonable
doubt that the defendant committed the
crime of which he was convicted." Id See
also State % Garcia, 744 ?2A 1029, 1030
(Utah CLApp.1887).
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ADDENDUM B

Rule 42

RULES OF THE UTAH SUPREME COURT

TITLE VI. JURISDICTION ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO COURT OF APPEALS.
Rule 42. Review of judgments, orders, and decrees of
Court of Appeals.
Unless otherwise provided by law, the review of a judgment, an order, and a
decree (herein referred to as "decisions") of the Court of Appeals shall be
initiated by a petition for a writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of Utah.
(Added, effective April 20, 1987.)

Rule 43. Considerations governing review of certiorari.
Review by a writ of certiorari is not a matter of right, but of judicial discretion, and will be granted only when there are special and important reasons
therefor. The following, while neither controlling nor wholly measuring the
court's discretion, indicate the character of reasons that will be considered:
(1) When a panel of the Court of Appeals has rendered a decision in
conflict with a decision of another panel of the Court of Appeals on the
same issue of law;
(2) When a panel of the Court of Appeals has decided a question of
state or federal law in a way that is in conflict with a decision of this
court;
(3) When a panel of the Court of Appeals has rendered a decision that
has so far departed from the accepted and usual course ofjudicial proceedings or has so far sanctioned such a departure by a lower court as to call
for an exercise of this court's power of supervision; or
(4) When the Court of Appeals has decided an important question of
municipal, state, or federal law which has not been, but should be, settled
by this court.
(Added, effective April 20, 1987.)

Rule 44. Certification and transmission of record; filing;
parties.
(a) Appearance, docketing fee, filing, and service. Counsel for the petitioner shall, within the time provided by Rule 45, pay the certiorari docketing
fee and file, with proof of service as provided by Rule 21, ten copies of a
petition which shall comply in all respects with Rule 46. The case then will be
placed on the certiorari docket of the court. Counsel for the petitioner shall
serve four copies of the petition on counsel for each party separately represented. It shall be the duty of counsel for the petitioner to notify all parties in
the case of the date of filing and of the certiorari docket number of the case.
Service and notice shall be given as required by Rule 21.
(b) Joint and separate petitions. Parties interested jointly, severally, or
otherwise in a decision may join in a petition for a writ of certiorari; any one
or more of them may petition separately; or any two or more of them may join
in a petition. When two or more cases are sought to be reviewed on certiorari
and involve identical or closely related questions, it will suffice to file a single
petition for a writ of certiorari covering all the cases.
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